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Emergency Powers and Constitutional Theory† 
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One reason why the law of the constitution is imperfectly understood is, that we 
too rarely put it side by side with the constitutional provisions of other countries. 
Here, as elsewhere, comparison is essential to recognition.1 
 
 
On either side of the North Atlantic, constitutional theory has become 
increasingly parochial. Far too often, constitutional theorists have been so 
distracted by local controversies and local debates that the broader aspiration of 
constitutionalism—subordinating arbitrary political power to law—is taken for 
granted.2 Surprisingly, this parochialism is also evident in contemporary debates 
over emergency powers. I say ‘surprisingly’ because we might reasonably expect 
that tension between the aspirations of liberal legalism and the exercise of 
emergency powers to point directly to the foundations of the legal order. 
Whatever else we might think about Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy, he was 
surely right to accord to the ‘exception’ a central theoretical importance: ‘[A] 
philosophy of concrete life,’ Schmitt argues, ‘must not withdraw from the 
exception and the extreme case, but must be interested in it to the highest 
degree.’3  
 
For Schmitt, emergencies expose a fundamental weakness in liberalism; the most 
law could do is to spell out who may exercise emergency powers. It cannot, 
however, set out in advance what would be a necessary or permissible response.4 
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1 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1920), at 200-201. 
2 I have in mind, here, the contemporary debate over the legal and political constitution in the 
United Kingdom and the ongoing controversy surrounding the interpretation of the constitution 
in the United States: infra notes 124 to 126. There are, however, some notable exceptions: see, for 
instance, Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
3 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, George Schwab, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985; originally published in 1922 and revised in 1934), at 15. 
4 According to Schmitt, the ‘precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one 
spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of extreme 
emergency and of how it is to be eliminated. The precondition as well as the content of 
jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily by unlimited. From the liberal 
constitutional point of view, there would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The most 
guidance the constitution can provide is to indicate who can act in such as case’ (ibid at 6-7). See 
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And so, in an emergency, ‘the state remains, whereas law recedes’.5 Responding 
directly or indirectly to Schmitt’s challenge to liberalism, the contemporary 
literature on emergency powers examines whether and how judicial or formal 
political institutions are able to constrain emergency powers invoked by the state. 
Yet framed in this way, the theoretical response to emergency powers is a 
parochial one that oscillates between assuming its relevance beyond the liberal 
democracies of the developed West and, vaguely recognizing its limits, restricting 
its application to those very liberal democracies. Both of these moves are 
problematic. The former ignores the unique character, in liberal democracies, of 
legal and political institutions and the culture that sustains them, and thus fails to 
take seriously the difficulties posed in transplanting them elsewhere. The latter 
tends toward parochialism, in as much as it declines to confront important 
challenges to constitutionalism posed by emergencies in developing legal 
systems—challenges that cast a new light on the emergency powers debate in the 
West and illuminate, in important ways, the relationship between legal and 
political responses to emergency powers. 
 
My goal in this paper is to engage constitutional theory from the Southeast Asian 
shores of the Pacific Basin, using the experiences of developing constitutional 
orders with emergency powers in an attempt to shift the attention of 
constitutional theorists away from parochial debates, toward an understanding of 
constitutional theory and emergency powers that extends beyond its familiar 
domain of liberal democracy. In so doing, I seek to shed light on the relationship 
between law and politics (or in terms of the contemporary discourse, between the 
legal and the political constitution) a relationship that is best understood when 
the struggle for legality in developing constitutional orders is brought into view 
and the relationship between the legal and the political is conceived in dynamic, 
rather than static, terms. 
 
Drawing on the experience of emergency powers in Southeast Asia, I demonstrate 
the importance of distinguishing between the distinct goals of establishing and 
preserving a constitutional order, goals which have important ramifications for 
the role that law and politics ought to play in constraining the state in times of 
crisis. Such distinction in turn supports three further claims. The first is that, in a 
nascent constitutional order, particularly in a post-conflict one, the main 
justification for invoking emergency powers—stabilizing a volatile political 
situation so as to establish viable legal and political institutions—will not be 
available in a stable, mature constitutional democracy. A second claim is that the 
development of a liberal constitutional order requires a social and political 
struggle to subordinate politics to law, which, once accomplished, has 
implications for the manner in which emergency powers are regulated through 
law. Finally, reflecting on the broader implications of these claims, I argue that 
contemporary debates in constitutional theory—particularly those that emphasize 
the importance of the political constitution—should not lose sight of the 
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Political Philosophy 61 at 65. 
5 Supra note 3 at 12. 
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fundamental importance of law as a constraint on arbitrary power, even in liberal 
democracies. I begin with an overview of the debate over emergency powers in 
contemporary constitutional theory. I then consider the challenges posed to 
constitutionalism by experience of emergency powers in Southeast Asia before 
examining the implications of those challenges for emergency powers and 




I. EMERGENCY POWERS, LAW, AND POLITICS 
 
The debate over emergency powers is, in many respects, a debate over the role of 
law and politics in constraining the state, and thus tracks broader debates in 
legal, political, and constitutional theory. Contemporary theories of emergency 
powers may be divided into three models, according to the type of check on 
emergency powers they favour. At the risk of some degree of simplification, these 
models might be described as legal-judicial, legal-procedural, and socio-political. 
The first model emphasizes the importance of the courts and of judicial review as 
a check on emergency powers in times of crisis. On this view, emergencies pose a 
serious threat to legality – the notion that sovereign power is subject to law – 
and, to counter this threat, the courts continue to play an important role in 
preserving the legal order. A second model stresses the importance of ex ante 
procedural checks on emergency powers. Those who advocate this model often 
express some concern about the ability of the courts to check executive powers in 
times of crisis; they argue instead that a procedural check on executive power, 
typically involving the legislative branch, would be more effective. A third model 
is also sceptical of the ability of the courts to limit executive power. It advocates 
instead a socio-political check on power, typically one that sees the final check on 
executive power as resting in ‘the people’ and in the social norms and values that 
sustain the legal order. In this part of the paper, I examine each of these models 
of emergency power, situating them within the broader debates in constitutional 
theory. I then reframe the debate over emergency powers so as to open up 
another line of inquiry, one that has not, thus far, been adequately explored. 
 
(a) Legal-Judicial Models 
 
Legal-judicial models rely on the judiciary as the main institution for checking 
the exercise of emergency powers by the executive. The courts, it is argued, are 
well-suited to constraining emergency powers for three reasons: they have the 
advantage of hindsight; they take up issues relating to emergency powers ‘not in 
the abstract … but in the context of specific cases’; and they are required to give 
reasons for their decisions thereby restricting what can be done in the next 
emergency.6 But an unqualified reliance on the courts is problematic because, as 
the courts often argue, national security matters fall outside their institutional 
                                                 
6 David Cole, ‘The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot’ (2004) 113 Yale 
Law Journal 1753 at 1762. 
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expertise and because the national security cases typically involve sensitive 
security intelligence information that governments are unwilling to furnish in 
open court. 
 
The most sustained contemporary defence of the legal-judicial model is found in 
the work of David Dyzenhaus. The starting-point of his approach is that judges 
have a duty to ‘uphold a substantive conception of the rule of law’7 in an 
emergency. We should not, he insists, give up ‘on the idea that law provides 
moral resources sufficient to maintain the rule-of-law project even when legal 
and political order is under great stress’.8 Dyzenhaus is therefore critical of 
attempts to respond to emergencies through exceptional legal regimes that 
operate alongside the ordinary legal system, and which in effect give the executive 
a free hand to act in a manner unconstrained by law.9 Thus, he seeks to show how 
the concerns of national security actors about the lack of judicial expertise and 
the confidentiality and sensitivity of intelligence sources can be addressed 
through ‘imaginative experiments in institutional design’,10 drawing on modern 
administrative law principles to deal with emergencies in a manner consistent 
with the rule of law. So a specialized administrative tribunal such as the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), which was created by the United 
Kingdom to deal with national security cases involving foreign terrorist suspects, 
shows in principle how this can be done. Its three-person panel, consisting of a 
former judge, a former administrative adjudicator, and a national security expert, 
would have the necessary expertise to review national security decisions and 
would be able, where necessary in the interests of confidentiality, to conduct 
closed sessions in the presence of a special advocate.11 A tribunal of this sort 
could, in theory, uphold rule of law values while recognizing the unique concerns 
that arise in national security cases. And although a measure of judicial deference 
would be afforded to such tribunals, the courts, though their review jurisdiction, 
would continue to play an important role in safeguarding the rule of law. 
According to Dyzenhaus, ‘judges always have some role in ensuring that the rule 
of law is maintained even when the legislature and the executive are in fact 
cooperating in the project, and they have an important role when such 
cooperation wanes or ceases in calling attention to that fact’.12  
 
(b) Legal-Procedural Models 
 
This brings us to the second model, which, sceptical of the ability of the courts to 
serve as a check on emergency powers, emphasizes the importance of procedural 
checks and, specifically, of a constitutional framework for such checks. Those 
                                                 
7 Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: CUP, 
2006), at 65. Dyzenhaus relies extensively on A.V. Dicey’s understanding of the rule of law in 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1920). 
8 Ibid. at 19. 
9 Ibid at 53. 
10 Dyzenhaus, ‘The State of Emergency in Legal Theory’ in Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, and 
Kent Roach eds., Global Anti-Terrorism at 67; see generally, ibid, Chapter 3, 121-73.  
11 Supra note 7 at 163. 
12 Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law, supra note 7 at 201.  
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who defend this model typically draw inspiration from the constitutional practice 
during the Roman Republic of appointing a dictator with virtually unlimited 
powers, for a fixed, six-month tenure, with the mandate of dealing swiftly with 
the emergency and restoring the normal constitutional order as quickly as 
possible. They also turn to the modern version of this model, defended by Clinton 
Rossiter in his influential work, Constitutional Dictatorship.13 Prominent among 
these theorists is Bruce Ackerman, who argues for an constitutionally entrenched 
state of emergency provision that would allow, after short period of unilateral 
executive action, that any emergency powers that accrue to the executive (say, to 
detain terrorist suspects) would be subject to the support of ‘an escalating 
cascade of supermajorities’ in Congress: ‘sixty percent for the next two months; 
seventy for the next; eighty thereafter.’14 Ackerman calls this the 
‘supermajoritarian escalator’ and explains its rationale as follows: 
 
The need for repeated renewal at short intervals serves as a first line of defence 
against a dangerous normalization of the state of emergency. The need for a new 
vote every two months publicly marks the regime as provisional, requiring self-
conscious approval for limited continuation. Before each vote, there will be a 
debate in which politicians, the press, and the rest of us are obliged to ask once 
more: Is this state of emergency really necessary?15 
 
To the supermajoritarian escalator, Ackerman adds another key feature. The 
executive will be under a duty to compensate all innocent persons that have been 
detained in an anti-terrorism dragnet. The assumption here is that these 
procedural mechanisms—the  supermajoritarian escalator, combined with the 
duty to give just compensation— will effectively contain the damage caused by 
the necessary, but regrettable, invocation of emergency powers, by providing a 
range of political and institutional incentives that would make emergency powers 
increasingly difficult to sustain. ‘The constitutional order places the extraordinary 
regime on the path to extinction,’ Ackerman tells us, because ‘[m]odern pluralist 
societies are simply too fragmented to sustain this kind of politics—unless, of 
course, the terrorists succeed in striking repeatedly with devastating effect.’16 One 
important virtue of this model, according to William E. Scheuerman, is that it 
‘provides for demanding institutional tests by means of which the polity can at 
least minimize the executive’s tendency to monopolize such judgments [about 
what measures are necessary]: emergency rulers are made strictly dependent on 
other institutional actors and their potentially competing conceptions of 
necessity.’17 
 
Ferejohn and Pasquino come to a similar conclusion concerning constitutionally 
entrenched emergency powers, albeit from a different starting point. Their aim is 
                                                 
13 Constitutional Dictatorship – Crisis Government in Modern Democracies (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002; originally published in 1948). 
14 Bruce Ackerman, ‘The Emergency Constitution’ (2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1029 at 1047. 
15 Ibid. at 1048. 
16 Ibid. 
17 ‘Presidentialism and Emergency Government’ in Victor V. Ramraj, ed., Emergencies and the 
Limits of Legality (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), at 283. 
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to show why, as between two sorts of emergency powers regimes – a legislative 
model (which uses ‘ordinary statutes that delegate special and temporary powers 
to the executive’18) and a constitutional or neo-Roman model (which, permits the 
‘delegation of powers to a president, or to some other constitutional authority, to 
issue decrees, to censor information, and to suspend legal processes and right’19 
with a view to restoring the constitutional order to its pre-emergency state) – the 
latter is preferable. Ferejohn and Pasquino favour the neo-Roman model 
because, first, unlike ordinary emergency legislation, which tends problematically 
toward permanence, the neo-Roman model conceives emergency powers as 
fundamentally conservative; its purpose is to restore the constitutional order to 
its original state and the powers that accrue during an emergency are fixed 
constitutionally in advance. 20 Ordinary legislation is more likely to lead to 
permanent changes to the law, they argue, and ‘if the justices on the Supreme 
Court are willing, this possibility of permanent transformation is even more 
likely.’21 
 
These models of emergency powers are one step removed from the legal-judicial 
model because, although they rely on the formal legal frame of the constitution, 
they do not see the courts as the primary check on executive power. The solution, 
for these theorists, to the problem of emergency powers is to craft an array of ex 
ante constitutional procedures to reduce the likelihood that emergency powers 
would be abused. Those theorists who defend this model tend to share with the 
political constitutionalists a scepticism of legal liberalism; they prefer to rely on a 
formal constitutional procedures as the first line of defence against executive 
abuse of emergency powers. But although these mechanisms are not judicial, 
‘well conceived constitutional emergency powers help realize the rule of law by 
subjecting them to legal devices manifesting the classic legal virtues of clarity, 
publicity, generality, prospectiveness, and stability.’22 
 
(c) Socio-Political Models 
 
Another step removed from judicial checks on emergency powers is what I have 
called, collectively, socio-political models of emergency powers. These models 
may incorporate elements of the two other models—accepting that the courts and 
the legislature may at times have a role to play in constraining the emergency 
state—but they locate the ultimate constraint on executive power elsewhere, in 
the informal, social and political realities of the society that is subject to 
emergency rule. Oren Gross therefore begins an essay, defending his extra-legal 
measure model, with the following epigraph from Justice Jackson’s dissenting 
judgment in Korematsu v. United States: ‘The chief restraint upon those who 
command the physical forces of the country … must be their responsibility to the 
                                                 
18 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, ‘The Law of the Exception: A Typology of Emergency 
Powers’ (2004) 2 International Journal of Constitutional Law 210 at 217. 
19 Ibid at 210. 
20 Ibid at 234. 
21 Ibid at 236. 
22 Scheuerman, supra note 4 at 76. 
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political judgments of their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of 
history.’23 And while he is quick to distinguish his own view from Gross’s, Mark 
Tushnet also regards the ultimate check on emergency powers as emanating from 
a social and political, not a legal, source. Concepts such as the rule of law, he 
argues, ‘cannot succeed at all without sociology and politics at their back.’24 I turn 
now to the details of their arguments. 
 
Gross is sceptical of the ability of the courts to check executive power in times of 
crisis, noting the tendency of courts to defer to the executive in the heat of any 
emergency.25 And while he does not, as Ferejohn and Pasquino do, consider 
constitutional emergency powers separately from ordinary emergency legislation, 
he regards them both as problematic since officials are able to ‘mold and shape 
the legal system, including the constitutional edifice, under the pretence of 
fighting off an emergency.’26 It may be that Gross has underestimated the ability 
of constitutional mechanisms to hold the executive in place (and for the courts to 
interpret these provisions in like fashion), but what is significant about Gross’s 
model, and what I wish to focus on, is his reliance on deliberative democracy 
(‘public deliberation and … the taking of responsibility by each and every member 
of the community’27) as the ultimate check on executive power. Drawing on John 
Locke’s account of the prerogative,28 Gross’s extra-legal measures model posits 
that in times of crisis, when public officials believe they must act contrary to law 
to prevent a catastrophe, they should do so, but then publicly acknowledge their 
extra-legal conduct and leave it to the people to decide their fate—either by 
ratifying their conduct or condemning it. According to this model, the ‘society 
retains the role of making the final determination whether the public official who 
acted extra-legally ought to be punished and rebuked or rewarded and 
commended for his actions.’29 Gross recognizes that extra-legal conduct may be 
ratified in a number of ways, ‘formal and informal, legal as well as political or 
social.’30 He specifically mentions prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute, jury 
nullification, mitigation, and pardon or clemency as legal forms of ratification; 
but he also specifically includes political and social ratification, such as the 
withholding of honorific awards and decorations. But behind these modes of 
ratification, Gross sees an ‘ethic of responsibility, not only on the part of officials, 
                                                 
23 ‘Stability and Flexibility: A Dicey Business’ in Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, and Kent Roach, 
eds., Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 90-106 at 90. 
24 ‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Conceptual Issues’ in Emergencies and 
the Limits of Legality, supra note 17, 145-55 at 155. 
25 Oren Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?’ 
(2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1011 at 1034. 
26 Ibid at 1068. 
27 Ibid at 1126. 
28 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government in P. Laslett, ed., Two Treatises on Government 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1988), esp. Chapter XIV, ‘Of Prerogative’, 374-381. 
29 Oren Gross, ‘Extra-Legality and the Ethic of Political Responsibility’ in Emergencies and the 
Limits of Legality, supra note 17, 60-94 at 64. 
30 Ibid at 65. 
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but also of the general public.’31 It is here, at the level of public debate and 
political responsibility, that he locates the ultimate check on errant officials. 
 
Tushnet takes this argument even further, criticizing Gross for being committed 
to the proposition that ‘law occupies the entire institutional of normative 
evaluation of emergency powers.’32 Whatever we might make of Tushnet’s 
critique of Gross, Tushnet’s own position is clear: ‘Politics is the obvious 
alternative to law as a means of regulating the exercise of emergency powers – 
not politics as a mere preference or the exercise of power for its own sake, but a 
principled or moralized politics.’33 Tushnet argues, using the combatant status 
review tribunals developed by the United States in Guantánamo Bay post 9-11 as 
an example, that the move toward more formal, due process requirements can be 
explained not by the prospect of judicial review, but rather by ‘bureaucratic 
pressures and professional interests’ on the part of lawyers and military officers 
which point in the direction of greater procedural formality.34 He argues: 
 
These bureaucratic and professional interests are the proximate reason for the 
adoption of procedures generally consistent with rule-of-law requirements for 
CSRTs. Behind them, though, lies what I have called a moralized politics. 
Bureaucrats and, even more, professionals, define their roles with reference to 
norms that have internalized. And, empirically, among those norms for the 
relevant bureaucrats and professionals is some degree of commitment to the rule 
of law. The legal back holes may be law-free zones, but they are not rule-of-law 
free zones, because they are created and sustained in part by a moralized 
politics.35 
 
So for Tushnet, the rule of law is not simply a matter of judicial review and can 
well exist in the absence of it, provided that an institutional culture is in place 
that nevertheless supports rule-of-law values. Just as Gross relies on a particular 
kind of democratic political culture that stands outside law as a check on state 
powers, so too does Tushnet argue that institutional and sociological factors 
might operate together with formal legality, to constrain state power in times of 
crisis. 
 
(d) Assumptions of Institutional Stability 
 
These theories show us the range of approaches within liberal democracies for 
constraining the state in an emergency. They also reveal a tension within liberal 
democratic constitutional theory between those who hold faith in the ability of 
legal constitutionalism or legal liberalism to check state power and those who 
prefer less court-centred means of constraint, relying instead on constitutionally-
entrenched procedural mechanisms or on informal social or political constraints 
on power. What is clear, however, is that these models all rest on assumptions 
                                                 
31 Ibid at 66. 
32 Supra note 24, 145-55 at 146. 
33 Ibid at 147. 
34 Ibid at 154. 
35 Ibid at 155. 
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about the stability of public institutions committed to the ideals of liberal-
democracy and the presence of the right kind of social and political culture. 
 
Consider, first, the assumption in the theories we have examined regarding the 
stability of the courts and formal political institutions. This assumption is evident 
in David Dyzenhaus’s account of constitutionalism in much of his work on 
emergency powers. In the introduction to his recent treatise on legality in times 
of crisis, Dyzenhaus makes it clear that his arguments are directed at societies 
that are committed to the rule of law, for which certain normative consequences 
follow: ‘[This] book is titled, “The Constitution of Law” because my argument is 
that, in circumstances when a society chooses to rule through law, it also chooses 
to subject itself to the constitutional principles of the rule of law, whether or not it 
articulates those principles in a bill of rights.’36 He then proceeds to substantiate 
his argument, drawing on examples primarily from the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and Australia.37 But a commitment on the part of a society to ‘subject itself to the 
constitutional principles of the rule of law’ is itself complex, not simply because a 
constitution might be written or not, but because the commitment is only 
meaningful if it is grounded on stable institutions and sustained by a particular 
kind of social and political culture. 
 
Assumptions about the stability of legal and political institutions are equally 
evident in Bruce Ackerman’s account. Although his arguments are informed by 
the experience of other countries, including South Africa and Canada, and his 
work demonstrates a solid appreciation of constitutional principles in Europe 
and elsewhere, the core of his thesis rests on assumptions about how institutions, 
particularly legislative institutions, function in a liberal democracy and he 
illustrates his proposal, quite naturally, by reference to the United States. So 
whatever the merits of his proposal might be, it is grounded in the assumption 
that democratic politics will work in a particular way38 and that minority 
interests will be adequately protected through the operation of stable institutions, 
whose dynamics are relatively predictable.39 By the same token, Scheuerman, 
who supports Ackerman’s proposal in principle, makes similar assumptions, 
while acknowledging his own focus on the peculiar institutional dynamics of 
emergency powers within the US presidential system.40 Similarly, Ferejohn and 
Pasquino concede that  the countries spoken of in their analysis ‘are very stable 
                                                 
36 Dyzenhaus, supra note 7 at 4. 
37 Elsewhere, Dyzenhaus suggests that his argument extends to ‘well-ordered societies’ that do 
more than ‘pay mere lip service to the rule of law’ (‘The State of Emergency in Legal Theory’, 
supra, note 10 at 88). As I argue in this paper, the extension of Dyzenhaus’s legality model is 
problematic without a corresponding shift in the underlying social and political culture.  
38 ‘Modern pluralist societies are simply too fragmented to sustain this kind of politics’ (so as to 
sustain emergency powers with eighty-percent support): see supra note 16 and accompanying 
text. 
39 See, for instance, Ackerman’s account of ‘minority control of information’, supra note 14 at 
1050-53. 
40 Scheuerman, supra note 17 at 258-59. 
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and entrenched democracies that have little need to invoke extreme 
constitutional measures to protect their regimes’.41  
                                                
 
Now consider Gross and Tushnet, whose arguments are, to different degrees, 
removed from the experience of formal legal institutions and practices. For his 
part, Gross insists that his is ‘not an “American” study, nor is it a post-September 
11th one’ and should be ‘treated as generally applicable to constitutional 
democratic regimes faced with the need to respond to extreme violent crises.’42 
His argument, in short, is that in liberal democracies, political responsibility for 
abuse of emergency powers rests ultimately in the hand of the people.43 But 
again, this assumption rests of a particular understanding of democratic politics 
and, implicitly, on civil society – a body politic that, at its core, would not (or 
perhaps should not), stand idly by while the government abused its powers in an 
emergency. As we have seen, Tushnet’s arguments likewise rest on assumptions 
about the institutional and social culture that supports rule-of-law values. 
 
All three of these models assume that the institutions are stable and the main 
issue is which institution, formal or informal, is in the best position to preserve 
the constitutional order in an emergency; the aim is, as Ferejohn and Pasquino 
argue, a conservative one.44 This point is not lost on critics of judicial activism in 
times of crisis, such as Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who argue that 
although the courts often adopt a deferential posture toward the executive, ‘the 
basic constitutional remains unaffected by the emergency’ and in ‘the United 
States, like other countries, the constitutional structure has never collapsed 
during an emergency’.45 We could, of course, take issues with the last point; 
presumably, the authors have only contemporary liberal democracies in their 
sights and have not considered the experience of Weimer Germany. But their 
basic insight calls for some reflection. What is it about contemporary liberal 
democracies that make them resistant, more or less, to a slide toward 
authoritarianism in an emergency? And what is it that might yet make them 
potentially vulnerable? 
 
Those who take the legal-judicial approach maintain their faith in the ability of 
the judiciary, perhaps in collaboration with the other branches of government, to 
do so; others, sceptical of the courts, stress the importance of formal political 
mechanisms and democratic checks within a broad constitutional framework; yet 
others stress the importance of political, institutional, and social factors. All 
appeal, in different ways, to democracy or constitutional ideals, but all too rarely 
does the debate confront squarely the fundamental justification for the liberal 
 
41 Supra note 18 at 216. 
42 Gross, ‘Chaos and Rules,’ supra note 25 at 1027. 
43 Gross’s extra-legal measures model is explicitly premised on assumptions about public political 
engagement: ‘In a democratic society, where such values as constitutionalism, accountability, and 
individual rights are entrenched and are traditionally respected, we can expect that the public 
would be circumspect about governmental attempts to justify or excuse illegal actions even if such 
actions have been taken, arguably, in the public’s name’ (ibid at 1123).  
44 Supra note 6. 
45 Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts (Oxford: OUP, 2007), at 4. 
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democratic constitutional order; they focus instead on how to better calibrate and 
optimize current institutional or political arrangements in the face of an 
emergency. Liberal democracies therefore suffer from an embarrassment of 
riches—those riches being the multiple layers of checks on political power, even 
in an emergency—which diverts scholarly attention from the core values of a legal 
order premised on the rule of law, and the political struggle that is needed to 
establish and sustain it. Considering the experience of developing constitutional 
orders with emergency powers helps to bring these basic questions back into 
focus, and to shed new light on the emergency powers debate and constitutional 
theory in liberal democracies and beyond.46 
 
 
                                                 
46 Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Mustafa make a similar case for studying the experience of courts in 
authoritarian regimes: ‘By looking at the extreme environment of a dictatorship, then, we may 
better understand the limited ability of courts to safeguard individual rights and the rule of the 
political game in democracies facing extraordinary circumstances’ (see ‘Introduction: The 
Function of Courts in Authoritarian Politics’ in Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Mustafa, eds., Rule by 
Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 1-22 at 3. 
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II. EMERGENCY POWERS IN DEVELOPING CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
 
If, as I have argued, emergencies pose a challenge within liberal democracies of 
preserving the constitutional order, they pose a distinct challenge in developing 
constitutional orders—the challenge of establishing a constitutional order in the 
first place. The project of establishing a constitutional order will of course vary 
with the circumstances in which the constitution comes into being – whether it is 
a negotiated and gradual post-colonial transfer of power, a re-drafting of a 
document by a transitional military government, or a post-conflict constitution 
negotiated and drafted in haste in the interest of maintaining political stability. In 
each of these situations (and others involving developing constitutional orders), 
the project of establishing a constitutional order is a complex one—and it is one 
that becomes even more complicated when emergency powers are invoked. Here 
we see in sharp relief the interplay between law, politics, and power, and, in 
particular, the role that political power must sometimes play in supporting a 
nascent constitutional order which, in turn, must subordinate sheer political 
power to law. In this part of the paper, I consider, with reference to examples in 
Southeast Asia, three challenges faced by developing constitutional orders—the 
challenge of establishing a post-conflict constitutional order while limiting resort 
to emergency powers to maintain political stability; the challenge of nurturing a 
social and political culture to sustain the constitutional order, one that channels 
political disputes into legal and political mechanisms that have broad public 
support; and the challenge of making a transition from a regime based on 
personal and political power to one based on impersonal and constitutional 
forms of power.  
 
(a) Emergency Powers in Nascent Democracies 
 
States emerging from conflict face a broad range of transitional justice problems, 
the most prominent of which is the fate of those accused of committing atrocities 
under the old regime. This has been the focus of much of the scholarly literature 
on transitional justice, hailing back to the Hart-Fuller debate following World 
War II.47 More recent scholarly work has focussed on another set of transitional 
justice problems in post-conflict and post-revolutionary contexts, problems 
relating to transitional constitutionalism more broadly.48 The general question is 
how to facilitate a social, political, and legal transformation that will extend 
legitimacy to the new constitutional order. Seeking accountability for past wrongs 
is the important backward-looking part of this process; but there is a forward-
                                                 
47 The original debate can be found in H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593-629 and Lon L. Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to 
Law – A Reply to Professor Hart (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review  630-72; both authors refined 
their positions in their subsequent work. See Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), esp. Chapter IX, 181-207, and Fuller, ‘The Morality that Makes Law 
Possible’ in The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), esp. 33-94.  
48 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1992), and Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in 
Political Transformation’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2009, later expanded into a treatise, 
Transitional Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
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looking dimension as well.49 Especially in a post-conflict situation, legal and 
political institutions must aspire to become impartial public venues in which 
political disagreements can be resolved through the rule-of-law ideal of 
‘adherence to known rules, as opposed to arbitrary government action.’50 But this 
aspiration to legality is complicated because, in many transitional situations, 
nascent governments are tempted to invoke constitutional emergency powers to 
address political volatility, throwing into question their commitment to the rule 
of law, a phenomenon I have described elsewhere as the ‘emergency powers 
paradox.’51 
 
The paradox is this: in nascent democracies, especially fragile, post-conflict ones, 
governments are often torn between the aim of establishing a constitutional order 
in which political disputes are resolved non-violently, according to rules accepted 
by most (the goal of legality) and the apparent need to invoke emergency powers 
at odds with the demands legality to bring about conditions of political stability 
upon which a culture of legality can be built.52 In Southeast Asia, East Timor 
provides an illuminating example of the paradox. Emerging from twenty-five 
years of Indonesian occupation, and thrown into a period of intense political 
violence, East Timor, with the assistance of a UN-backed peace-enforcement 
mission and a UN transitional administration,53 sought to stabilize the political  
situation and start the process of rebuilding state institutions, including its legal 
system.54  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1999 independence vote, thousands of lives 
were lost in violent clashes between pro-Indonesian groups backed by the 
Indonesian military, and pro-independence groups. During this period, the 
international forces found it necessary to detain without trial many individuals, 
until an interim legal mechanism, the Detainee Management Unit, was set up to 
process their cases and the political situation was stabilized and civilian 
authorities could take over.55 But now, after the initial period of instability amid 
the reconstruction, the political situation remains volatile. On 30 May 2006, as 
violent protests by disgruntled rebel soldiers began to escalate and the death toll 
began to rise, East Timor declared it first formal state of emergency. The 
emergency ended within weeks, after international forces were deployed to help 
                                                 
49 As Teitel argues, ‘in periods of radical change … constitutions are simultaneously backward- 
and forward-looking’ (‘Transitional Jurisprudence’, ibid, at 2015). 
50 Ibid at 2016-17. 
51 See ‘The Emergency Powers Paradox’ in Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, eds., 
Emergency Powers in Asia (Cambridge: CUP, forthcoming). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Respectively, the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and UN 
Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET). 
54 See, generally, Damien Kingbury, ‘East Timor: The Difficult Birth of a New State’ in Southeast 
Asia: A Political Profile, 2nd ed. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005), 393-413; Hilary 
Charlesworth, ‘The Constitution of East Timor, May 20, 2002’ (2003), 1 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 325. 
55 See Simon Chesterman, ‘UNaccountable? The United Nations, Emergency Powers, and the Rule 
of Law in Asia’ in Emergency Powers in Asia, supra note 51. 
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stabilize the situation. More recently, following an assassination attempt on its 
President and Prime Minister in February 2008, the East Timorese declared a 
state of emergency under Article 25 of its new constitution56 and took steps to 
integrate its police and military forces under a central command to better address 
the threat of political violence. Once again, the formal emergency ended in a 
matter of weeks. In declaring a state of emergency, East Timor took a 
considerable risk; neighbouring Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
have all spent a significant part of their post-colonial existence under emergency 
rule. To its credit, East Timor lifted its state of emergency two months later, in 
April 2008, but the political situation remains fragile while institution-building 
efforts continue. 
 
In the context of a nascent constitutional democracy struggling to emerge from 
decades of conflict, the invocation of emergency powers, although paradoxical, 
might yet be reconciled with a longer-term aspiration of constitutionalism. 
Emergency powers, if used with moderation, can provide a sufficient degree of 
stability to enable political and legal institutions to take hold. East Timor and 
other nascent constitutional orders are confronted with what Bernard Williams 
calls ‘the first political question’—by which he means ‘the securing of order, 
protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation.’57 Until this basic 
‘question’ (or, perhaps, pre-condition of organized government) is addressed, 
nuanced debates about legal and political mechanisms for accountability and 
principles of constitutional interpretation are premature; the challenge that 
emergency powers pose for constitutional orders brings into focus the 
fundamental challenge of constitutionalism – that of subordinating political 
violence and the arbitrary exercise of coercive state power to law. 
 
But even if a tolerable level of political stability were established for long enough 
to rebuild the basic institutional infrastructure, to enable the state to function, 
two challenges would remain. One is the challenge to aspiring democracies to 
create a legal and political culture of accountability, in the face of competing 
social and political structures premised on different understandings of political 
authority and accountability. Another is the challenge to strong executive 
governments to entrust political power in other institutions or branches of 
government.  
 
                                                 
56 Article 25 permits the President, in the event of ‘effective or impending aggression by a foreign 
force, of a serious disturbance or treat of serious disturbance to the democratic constitutional 
order, or of a public disaster’, after consulting key government bodies and with the approval of the 
legislature, to declare of a state of siege or state of emergency. The emergency, though subject to 
renewal, is limited to 30 days and Article 25(5) provides that certain specified rights (the right to 
life, physical integrity, citizenship, non-retroactivity of the criminal law, defence in a criminal case 
and freedom of conscience and religion, the right not to be subjected to torture, slavery or 
servitude, the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment , 
and the guarantee of non-discrimination) cannot be suspended. Article 25(6) requires that the 
authorities ‘restore constitutional normality as soon as possible.’ 
57 ‘Realism and Moralism in Political Theory’ in Geoffrey Hawthorn, ed. In the Beginning was the 
Deed (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 1-17 at 3. 
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(b) A Legal and Political Culture of Accountability 
 
Assuming that some degree of political stability is present in the early stages of 
political development toward constitutional government, the absence of a strong 
constitutional culture remains problematic, particularly when emergency powers 
are invoked in response to resurgent political violence. In times of constitutional 
development or transition, other, traditional forms of political accountability may 
yet be able to supplement newer forms of legal accountability. But when legally 
authorized emergency powers are invoked in the midst of a constitutional 
transition, traditional forms of political accountability may not be strong enough 
to keep the constitutional transition on track. 
 
Consider the experience of constitutionalism and emergency powers in Thailand. 
In the decade before the bloodless military coup in September 2006, Thailand’s 
constitutional reforms showed much promise. The 1997 Constitution could 
readily be seen in a positive light, as part of ‘the new constitutionalism in Asia 
and the developing world more generally.’58 Not only did the constitution 
guarantee rights that would not be ‘out of place in a European or North American 
constitution,’59 it also created institutions, including a constitutional court and a 
national human rights commission, to protect and implement those rights. In the 
midst of this constitutional transition, the government of Thaksin Shinawatra 
unleashed the coercive power of the state in two ways that called into question 
the government’s commitment to genuine constitutional reform. The first was a 
‘war on drugs’ launched in 2003, which resulted in the arbitrary killing of 
thousands of alleged drug traffickers.60 The second was its role in and violent 
response to the escalation of political violence in the Southern Provinces since 
early 2004, including the ‘Krue Se’ incident in which security forces killed 32 
militants in a mosque and the ‘Tak Bai’ incident in which, some 86 protesters 
suffocated after being piled into army trucks.61 In 2005, the government declared 
a formal state of emergency in the South;62 the killings by both sides in this 
conflict number in the thousands.63 
 
Although the wave of popular protests in 2006, which later culminated in the 
military coup, were inspired by a number of other grievances against the Thaksin 
government, the war on drugs and the violence in the South form an important 
background to the coup.64 While it may never be known with certainty what role 
King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who has reigned since 1946, had in relation to the 
                                                 
58 Andrew J. Harding, ‘Thailand’s Reforms: Human Rights and the National Commission’ (2006) 
1 Journal of Comparative Law 88  at 95. 
59 Ibid at 97. 
60 Human Rights Watch estimates the death toll from this campaign at 2800: see ‘Thailand’s 
“War on Drugs”’ (available at: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/03/12/thaila18278.htm).  
61 Supra note 58. 
62 Ibid. 
63 One grim narrative of the conflict is recounted by Human Rights Watch in its report, ‘No One is 
Safe: Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces’ (August 2007), 
volume 19, no. 13(C). 
64 Thongchai Winichakul, ‘Toppling Democracy’ (2008) 38 Journal of Contemporary Asia 11. 
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coup, those who supported the coup had called for the King’s intervention; the 
coup has been described as a royalist coup, engineered by pro-monarchy 
elements in the military and the political elite, and supported by prominent Thai 
academics and others.65 Although the King is seen by many as standing above 
ordinary Thai politics, few would dispute that he is widely revered in Thailand 
and has thus for decades played a critical role at crucial moments in 
contemporary Thai politics.66  
 
Contemporary Thailand is torn between two models of government: a Western-
style constitutional democracy in which legal and political institutions play a 
critical role in moderating government power and a more traditional Buddhist 
conception of democracy, which ‘requires a ruler always to be mindful of the 
dharma, i.e., the teachings of the Buddha concerning the worldly responsibility 
of a leader in a society, as the principal guidance of his rule’,67 and to provide for 
the welfare of his people. While the period of constitutional development ushered 
in by the 1997 Constitution witnessed the establishment of several key 
constitutional and human rights institutions, Western-style liberal democracy is 
by no means entrenched in Thailand,68 as the 2006 coup and the recent turmoil 
in September 2008 demonstrate. As one scholar of Thai constitutionalism 
observes, the ‘Thai mindset reveals a strong preference for more tangible but 
extra-constitutional sources of power – the military collective and individuals, 
manipulated and appointed Houses in Parliament, and the monarchy – all of 
which claimed, with some justification no doubt, to know what was best of the 
people [better] than the people themselves.’69 The legal constitution in Thailand 
has so far been unable to constrain abuses of state power, whether in the context 
of a formal emergency or otherwise. According to the royalist view, it is a ‘cultural 
constitution’ premised on the legitimacy of the King that is of primary 
importance and reflects the reality of Thai political culture.70 To the extent that 
the role of holding the government in check is currently played by the King and 
the military, however, the problem is that the power that the monarchy (in 
particular) wields is a deeply personal one; it is ‘overly dependent on the 
charisma of King Bhumibol’71 and does not provide ‘a truly viable political system 
that could withstand the changes of time and personalities.’72  
 
(c) Beyond Formal Legality 
 
The examples considered thus far involve jurisdictions where the political 
situation is volatile and public institutions remain under-developed, as in East 
                                                 
65 Ibid at 30. 
66 See generally: Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Kings, Country and Constitutions: Thailand’s 
Political Development 1932-2000 (London and New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2004). 
67 Ibid at 20. 
68 Ibid at 29. 
69 Ibid at 29. 
70 Supra note 64 at 28. 
71 Supra note 64 at 33. 
72 Supra note 66 at 29. 
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Timor, or where legal constraints are not fully embraced and the constitutional 
order is chronically unstable, as in Thailand. In some parts of Southeast Asia, 
however, the legal order is highly developed, at least as measured by the standard 
of legal education73 and professionalism, as well as anti-corruption based 
governance indicators.74 On these measures, Singapore and Malaysia rate very 
highly indeed. Moreover, as far as conformity by public authorities with the 
demands of formal legality is concerned, Singapore is exemplary; rare is the 
instance in Singapore where executive power is exercised without formal legal 
authority.  
 
Even so, neither Singapore nor Malaysia can claim a strong tradition of judicial 
activism in public law matters. In Singapore, the only case in which legislation 
has been invalidated on constitutional grounds was quickly overturned by the 
Court of Appeal.75 In Malaysia, the judicial crisis of 1988, in which several activist 
judges were removed from the bench for questionable reasons,76 still looms large 
over the courts. Although the courts do intervene from time to time to reverse 
administrative lower-level administrative decisions, when it comes to national 
security cases involving the formal invocation of emergency powers or detention 
without trial under the Internal Security Act, the courts have been extremely slow 
to intervene.77 In the few rare instances where they have shown some interest in 
scrutinizing the basis for the detention, the government’s reaction has been swift 
and unequivocal.  
 
For example, in post-independence Malaysia, the government resorted to 
emergency powers to deal first with the Indonesian Confrontation in 1964 and 
again in 1969, in response to ethnic riots and political violence in the wake of a 
general election on May thirteenth of that year.78 The Proclamation of Emergency 
and the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance of 15 May 1969 have not been 
rescinded and the government continued to issue emergency regulations under 
                                                 
73 For an overview of legal education in Asia, see Tan Cheng Han et al., ‘Legal Education in Asia’ 
(2006), 1 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 184-207. 
74 According to Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index, Singapore is the 
fourth least corrupt in the world; Malaysia ranks 43rd out of 179 countries See: Annual Report 
2007 (June 2008), available online at: www.transparency.org/publications/publications. 
75 In Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 2 SLR 410, [1998] 1 SLR 943, Justice 
Karthigesu held that a provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act extending the reach of the 
act extra-territorially, but only in respect of Singapore citizens, was inconsistent with the 
guarantee of equality in Article 12(1) of the Constitution. On a criminal reference, the Court of 
Appeal disagreed, arguing that the classification was reasonable for reason, among others, of 
Parliament’s intention to respect international comity: see Public Prosecutor v. Taw Cheng Kong 
[1998] 2 SLR 410, [1998] SGCA 37 at para. 71. 
76 For an overview, see Visu Sinnadurai, ‘The 1988 Judiciary Crisis and its Aftermath’ in in 
Andrew J. Harding and H.P. Lee, eds., Constitutional Landmarks in Malaysia: The First 50 
Years 1957-2007 (Kuala Lumpur: LexisNexis, 2007), 173-95. 
77 For an overview of these cases, see Michael Hor, ‘Law and Terror: Singapore Stories and 
Malaysian Dilemmas’ in Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, and Kent Roach, eds., Global Anti-
Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 273-94. 
78 For a detailed account of this incident and its legal consequences, see Cyrus V. Das, ‘The 
May13th Riots and Emergency Rule’ in Harding & Lee, eds., supra note 76, 103-113.  
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these instruments well after Parliament resumed sat on 20 February 1971. This 
was a problem because the constitution provided that in a formal state of 
emergency the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) could ‘until both Houses of 
Parliament are sitting, promulgate ordinances having force of law, if satisfied that 
immediate action is required.’79 In a death penalty case arising out of emergency 
regulations issued in 1975, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in one of 
its last decisions on the Malaysian Constitution, held in December 1978 that the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s emergency powers had lapsed once Parliament had sat 
in February 1971, thus invalidating all subsequent emergency regulations.80 But 
the legal consequences of this ruling were minimal. Parliament quickly enacted 
the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979, which retroactively validated every 
piece of subsidiary legislation made under the 1969 Emergency Proclamation 
after Parliament sat in 1971, and it later amended the Constitution to make the 
proclamation of any emergency, its continued operation, and the validity and 
continuation in force of emergency ordinances all non-justiciable.81  
 
Similarly, a bold 1989 case in Singapore, Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home 
Affairs,82 in which the courts attempted to exercise greater judicial scrutiny of 
detention without trial under the Internal Security Act, was swiftly overruled by 
constitutional and legislative amendment. The Court of Appeal, in a departure 
from a line of authorities in Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia, rejected in obiter 
dicta the subjective test in national security cases (according to which it need 
only be shown that the President was in fact satisfied that the detention was 
necessary on national security grounds83) in favour of an objective test (requiring 
that the President’s satisfaction was based on national security considerations). 
By subsequent constitutional amendment, the government brought the scope of 
judicial review in national security cases under the terms of the security 
legislation itself.84 It also amended the Internal Security Act85 to freeze the scope 
of judicial review at 13 July 1971 (the date of a decision86 of the Court of Appeal 
which had affirmed the subjective test) and to restrict judicial review to matters 
of procedural compliance.  
 
As far as constitutionalism is concerned, the problem in Malaysia and Singapore 
is not the absence of a legal infrastructure nor is it a matter of an unstable 
constitutional order, as in Thailand. The legal infrastructure is solid and, as the 
national security cases demonstrate, both governments are committed to the 
formal demands of the constitution; when faced with a constitutional setback, 
they enact a formal constitutional amendment to remove the difficulty.87 If the 
law is to play a role in constraining state power generally, or in times of crisis, a 
                                                 
79 Article 150(2) of the Malaysian Constitution (since amended). 
80 Teh Cheng Poh v. Public Prosecutor [1980] AC 458, [1979] 2 WLR 623 (PC). 
81 Constitution (Amendment) Act 1981 (Act A 544), s. 15. 
82 [1989] 1 MLJ 69 (Singapore CA).  
83 See Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] AC 206 (HL). 
84 See Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1989, No 1 of 1989.  
85 Internal Security (Amendment) Act, No 2 of 1989. 
86 Lee Mau Seng v. Minister of Home Affairs, Singapore [1971] 2 MLJ 137 (Sing. HC). 
87 Supra note 77. 
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different kind of transformation must take place—a transformation in the culture 
of accountability. This requires a transformation not only in the judiciary, but 
also in the broader social and political culture. And this suggests, in turn, a limit 
to what judges can do in the absence of strong social and political support.  
 
In their recent work on the ‘judicial politics’ of the courts in authoritarian 
regimes, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Mustafa explain why authoritarian regimes 
might yet allow the courts more leeway in constitutional cases. Courts are 
important in such regimes because they allow authoritarian regimes to ‘establish 
social control and sideline political opponents, bolster a regime’s claim to ‘legal’ 
legitimacy, strengthen administrative compliance with the state’s own 
bureaucratic machinery and solve coordination problems among competing 
factions in the regime, facilitate trade and investment, and implement 
controversial policies so as to allow political distance from core elements of the 
regime.’88 This approach suggests that the opening of a space for 
constitutionalism to take hold may be the result of political rather than legal 
developments. But Ginsburg and Mustafa also recognize the role that ‘judicial 
support networks’—‘institutions and associations, both domestic and 
international, that facilitate the expansion of judicial power by actively initiating 
litigation and/or supporting the independence of judicial institutions if they 
come under attack’89—play in changing the legal landscape, and the threat that 
they pose to authoritarian regimes.  
 
It is not clear how much of Ginsburg and Mustafa’s analysis can be extended to 
Singapore and Malaysia, which, despite their authoritarian elements, have some 
of the formal and practical elements of democratic accountability. But their 
general point—that in legal systems lacking a strong tradition of judicial review, a 
shift to a rights culture requires a political change—resonates with the experience 
in Singapore and Malaysia. Just as a key litmus test for democracy is the 
willingness of an incumbent government to cede power to a democratically 
elected opposition, the litmus test for constitutionalism is the willingness of the 
government to abide by an adverse ruling by the courts. There may eventually 
come a point, following such a momentous shift in political culture, when a 
culture of accountability permeates all branches of government and, in Ginsburg 
and Mustafa’s words, ‘the wheels of justice … simply have too much momentum 
to stop.’90 At this point, the courts may well be able to play a greater role in 
constraining state power, even in times of crisis. But until this constitutional 
tipping-point is reached, the struggle for legality is primarily a political one. 
 
 
                                                 
88 Supra note 46 at 4, following Tamir Mustafa, ‘The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, 
Politics, and Economic Reform in Egypt’ (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) (numbering of points in the 
original text omitted). 
89 Supra note 46 at 13. 
90 Ibid at 21. 
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III. EMERGENCY POWERS AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 
 
The challenge posed by emergencies in some developing legal systems in 
Southeast Asia is a challenge to the very establishment of a constitutional order 
in the first place. We have seen how a nascent constitutional order may need to 
invoke emergency powers to establish the basic conditions of stability upon which 
a legal and political system can be built; we have also seen how, in the absence of 
a strong legal culture, other institutions might play a role in checking the abuse of 
power, and the challenges these arrangements pose for the creation of 
impersonal controls on political power; and we have seen how, even when a legal 
infrastructure is firmly in place and formal legality is generally respected, the 
shift from formal conception of legality in which law is understood primarily as 
an instrument of government to a substantive conception in which it is conceived 
as a means of controlling political power, requires a conscious and deliberate 
political choice. In other work, I examine the implications of these observations 
for emergency powers and constitutionalism in Southeast Asia.91 My concern in 
this paper is to consider what lessons the experience of emergency powers in 
developing constitutional orders hold for constitutionalism and constitutional 
theory in established liberal democracies. In this part, I return to the theories of 
emergency powers identified in the first part of the paper, and I show how the 
experience of emergency powers and constitutionalism in Southeast Asia throw 
their basic assumptions about constitutionalism into question. 
 
(a) Conflict and Constitutionalism 
 
Constitutionalism, understood as a commitment to the rule of law, is contentious 
precisely because the rule of law is itself a contested concept, with formal and 
substantive or thinner and thicker versions.92 For A.V. Dicey, the rule of law was, 
under the English constitution, the basis upon which power may be exercised, as 
opposed to ‘the influence of arbitrary power’, and it excluded ‘the existence of 
arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part 
of government’.93 Lon Fuller famously argued that to have a legal system at all, 
there must be clear, stable, public, consistent, comprehensible, and prospective 
rules, capable of obedience and faithfully implemented.94 Others, notably Ronald 
Dworkin, have defended a substantive version of law (avoiding the term ‘rule of 
                                                 
91 Supra note 51. 
92 See respectively, Paul Craig, ‘Formal and Procedural Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An 
Analytic Framework’ [1997] Public Law 467; Randall Peerenboom, ‘Varieties of the Rule of Law: 
An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion’ in Peerenboom, ed., Asian Discourses of the Rule of 
Law (London: Routledge, 2004), 1-55; Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monohan, ‘Democracy and 
the Rule of Law’ in Hutchinson & Monohan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1987), 97-123. 
93 Dicey, ‘Rule of Law and Its General Applications’ (Chapters IV), supra, note 1, at 198. The rule 
of law also required that everyone, including public officials, be subject to the ordinary laws as 
administered by the courts, and signified that, in English law, the source of constitutional 
principles was ‘the ordinary law of the land’ not their codification in a written constitution (at 
198-99). 
94 The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), at 39. 
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law’), which seeks to embed law in a larger conception of justice, consistent with 
the community’s institutions and its ‘conceptions of fairness.’95 At the same time, 
however, the rule of law has been criticised for sustaining an ‘elitist politics’ with 
an ‘impoverished sense of community’96 and, because of the multiple meanings of 
the rule of law in World Bank policy, for being used to ‘justify the goals of any 
given project’ and to deflect criticisms ‘by alternating between the purposes of the 
different conceptions at play.’97 
 
Despite this seemingly interminable disagreement on the scope of the concept 
that even this brief survey reveals, a commitment to the rule of law in post-
conflict situations, such as East Timor, may well point us back to a core function 
of the rule of law. On the one hand, the concept of the rule of law might yet be 
criticized on definitional grounds. Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa 
Brooks have recently argued that although ‘precise definitions may be impossible, 
this lack of clarity on the part of policymakers can be very damaging, especially in 
fragile post-intervention societies, for it allows policymakers and practitioners to 
pursue poorly thought-through and often internally contradictory programs.’98 
The problem, they argue, is that the ‘conflation of the formal and substantive 
aspects of the rule of law has led to a simplistic emphasis on structures, 
institutions, and the “modernization” of legal codes, in a cookie-cutter way that 
has generally taken little account of the differences between societies.’99 They are 
mindful of the danger that the rule of law risks becoming a wish-list for a wide 
array of projects including reforming key public institutions and legal codes, 
building capacity within the legal profession, and enhancing legal access,100 often 
without sufficient regard for local customs and practices. 
 
But in view of these concerns about the ambiguity or even vacuity of the concept, 
some international law scholars have suggested a purposive or functional 
understanding of the rule of law which forces us to ask why we might aspire to a 
system of legality in the first place. The post-conflict reconstruction context 
suggests an answer; we want, according to Simon Chesterman, to use the rule of 
law to ‘establish non-violent mechanisms for resolving political disputes.’101 As 
we have seen, it may at times be necessary to invoke and then gradually ease up 
on emergency powers to allow nascent legal and political institutions an 
opportunity to develop and to earn the confidence of the people.102 But post-
                                                 
95 Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), at 405. 
96 Hutchinson & Monohan, supra note 92 at 111. 
97 Alvaro Santos, ‘The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development’ 
in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, eds., The New Law and Economic Development: A 
Critical Appraisal (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 253-300 at 276. 
98 Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 73. 
99 Ibid at 74. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Simon Chesterman, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 331. 
102 It is also important, for the same reasons, that governments in nascent constitutional orders 
wean themselves quickly from emergency powers to avoid undermining the rule of law project in 
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conflict situations serve as an important reminder of why, at least in a deeply 
divided society, legality is highly valued; it is seen as a way of managing political 
disagreement through processes and institutions whose legitimacy and authority 
are acceptable to most. In these situations, rule of law does not presuppose an 
individualistic ideology nor does it, by focussing on the courts, pose a threat to 
the development of a vibrant political democracy;103 rather it secures the 
foundation on which a constitutional order—whose legal and political institutions 
are yet to be fully formed and whose precise shape may well remain contentious—
can be built.104 
 
In the context of liberal democracies, it would be a rare case when emergency 
powers would be needed to stabilize a volatile political situation so as to ensure 
that political conflict does not undermine organized government. For instance, 
Bruce Ackerman argues in the US context that even if a suitcase bomb were to 
destroy a major American city, the government of the day would survive.105 This 
suggests, he argues, that the goal of government following such an attack is not to 
secure the existence of organized government, but to reassure ‘its terrorized 
citizens.’106 Similarly, in the House of Lords’ first major post-9/11 decision, A. v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department107 (known informally as the 
Belmarsh case), Lord Hoffman held (albeit in dissent on this point) that the 
terrorist threat facing the United Kingdom was insufficient to constitute a threat 
to the life of the nation such as would permit derogation under Article 15108 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: 
 
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived physical 
destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate the ability of 
fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life 
of the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the balance, but there is 
no doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. The Spanish people have not said what 
happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it was, threatened the life of their nation. 
Their legendary pride would not allow it. Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does 
not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil 
community.109 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the first place. The permanent emergency in Malaysia shows us the danger of holding on to 
emergency powers for longer than is strictly necessary. 
103 For a critique of the rule of law on these grounds, see Hutchinson & Monohan, supra note 92. 
104 Despite their critique of the rule of law, Hutchinson and Monohan concede, in principle, a role 
for the rule of law in securing basic institutions: ‘A commitment to democracy does not mean that 
constraints on popular decision-making must everywhere be condemned. It is important that the 
basic institutions and practices of democracy—free elections, debate and assembly—be 
guaranteed and extended’ (supra note 92 at 122). 
105 Supra note 14 at 1036-37. 
106 Ibid at 1037. 
107 [2004] UKHL 56. 
108 Article 15 provides: ‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this 
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.’ 
109 At para. 96. 
 22
© 2008 Victor V. Ramraj 2008 - Not for citation or attribution without permission. 
 
None of the other judges argued positively that the threat was in fact an 
existential one. Most held either that the question of whether an emergency 
actually existed was a political question that was not for the courts to 
determine110 or that based on the Strasbourg jurisprudence on emergencies, 
there was indeed a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”111 In 
sharp contrast, in a post-conflict setting, securing the existence of the state 
remains an overriding objective. 
                                                
 
(b) Liberal Democracies and the Struggle for Legality 
 
A second important lesson to be gleaned from the experience of constitutionalism 
and emergency powers in Southeast Asia concerns the struggle for legality. 
Although legal liberalism, in its orthodox versions, insists that law is normatively 
prior to the state,112 developing constitutional orders remind us that historically 
and empirically this is not the case. As Thailand’s experience with 
constitutionalism suggests, absent a social and political culture which sees 
constitutional law and judicial review as playing a critical role in constraining the 
arbitrary power of the state, the constitution is unlikely to be able to provide a 
serious check on emergency powers. What does this observation tell us about the 
aspiration of legality in liberal democracies? 
 
Liberal legalism is sometimes attacked in liberal democracies for its hegemonic 
control over social and political life.113 Some of these criticisms are certainly 
justified. Yet one of the great achievements of liberal democracy is its ability, by 
and large, to subordinate violent political conflict to law and to channel political 
disputes into public institutions designed, ideally, to resolve those conflicts in a 
manner that most accept as legitimate. The experience of constitutionalism in 
Malaysia and Singapore reminds us that a commitment to a substantive notion of 
legality is not easily given; however, once it is given, this commitment marks a 
transformation in the way that political conflicts are to be resolved. Emergencies 
test the commitment to legality, inviting Schmittian scepticism of liberalism’s 
ability to respond to a crisis. The experience of developing constitutional orders 
reminds us that we should not take for granted the liberal constitution’s capacity 
 
110 See, for instance, Lord Bingham at para. 29 (deference should be made to the Home Secretary 
in what is ‘a pre-eminently political judgment’ and based on considerations of relative 
institutional competence); and Lord Hope at para. 116 (‘the questions whether there is an 
emergency and whether it threatens the life of the nation are pre-eminently for the executive and 
for Parliament’). Lord Scott expressed reservations as to whether the ’public emergency‘ was one 
that threatens the life of the nation, but was ’prepared to allow the Secretary of State the benefit of 
the doubt on this point‘ (para. 154). 
111 For Lord Rodger, the situation in December 2001 was ‘no less grave than other situations 
which the European Court of Human Rights has regarded as constituting a “public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation”’ (para. 165). 
112 See David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Compulsion of Legality’ in Emergencies and the Limits of Legality, 
supra note 17, 33-59 at 36, referring to Hans Kelsen’s ‘Identity Thesis’. 
113 See Mark Tushnet, ‘Critical Legal Theory’ in M.P. Golding & W.A. Edmundson, Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 80-89. 
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to respond to political violence through law or the significance of the 
commitment to do so. 
 
Reflecting on the rule of law before an audience in Kuala Lumpur, former British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair explained his reaction to an adverse ruling by the 
House of Lords in the Belmarsh case: 
 
We had sought to say to suspected terrorists: You can leave this country freely; 
but if you stay in Britain, you stay locked up. We couldn’t be sure that we could 
successfully prosecute these people. The British public is greatly attached to the 
rule of law. But overwhelmingly it supported our position as a government. But 
the House of Lords held that these anti-terrorism laws were contrary to the 
Human Rights Act. I remember being absolutely furious. I could see the terrorist 
threat. The intelligence about it was daily. The capacity of these people to do evil 
was manifest. The House of Lords, I felt, seriously misjudged the threat and 
misunderstood the only practical way of dealing with it. Indeed, a few months 
later, terror struck London and over 50 innocent people died in the worst 
terrorist attack London ever saw. I recall pacing up and down my study at 10 
Downing Street, berating the court and expostulating at the ludicrous way they 
sought to substitute their judgment for mine. A member of staff concurred and 
added: ‘They should be stopped from ruling in these cases.’ Immediately I turned 
round to him and said: ‘Oh no. That would be completely wrong. I profoundly 
disagree with them but I profoundly believe in their right to do it. I think they 
have made the wrong judgment. But I think it is right that they can; they are 
above me, not me above them.114 
 
The Blair government’s decision to respect the House of Lords ruling in the 
Belmarsh case and amend its anti-terrorism legislation despite its profound 
disagreement with the result is a mark of a liberal constitutional democracy’s 
commitment to legality – all the more so since, legally, all the House of Lords did 
was to issue a declaration that s. 23 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.115  
 
The three models of emergency powers described in the first part of the paper 
respond in different ways to the challenge posed by the state’s invocation of 
emergency powers. They all recognize, at least implicitly, the importance of a 
commitment to legality, although they are incomplete in different ways. The 
legal-procedural model acknowledges the importance of ex ante constraints on 
the state’s response to emergencies, but to the extent that it carves out a space for 
governments to act unconstrained by law, is inconsistent with a commitment to 
substantive legality. Ackerman’s proposal falls short on this score to the extent 
that it relies on economic incentives (the potential need to compensate) rather 
than substantive values (a right against arbitrary detention) as its main check 
against abuse of power by the state.116 Yet in so far as his proposal seeks to 
                                                 
114 The text of Tony Blair’s 22nd Sultan Azlan Shah Law Lecture, was reprinted under the title, 
‘Upholding the Rule of Law: A Reflection’ in The Straits Times (Singapore) (7 August 2008), p. 
27. 
115 The courts do not have the power to strike down legislation as invalid under the Human Rights 
Act 1998. 
116 See Cole, supra note 6. 
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subject the invocation of emergency powers to procedural safeguards, his 
proposal is consistent with the broader aims of legality, though it may be 
incomplete. 
 
Dyzenhaus’s proposal is important in as much as it acknowledges that the rule of 
law project (as he calls it) requires the cooperation of all branches of government. 
Although his theory stresses the important role of the courts, he argues that the 
precise institutional arrangement in an emergency is not as important as the role 
that the institutions play in securing compliance with law: ‘I have argued,’ 
explains Dyzenhaus, ‘that the question of how the institutions of a particular legal 
order attempt to bring to realization the ideal of the rule of law is less important 
than that they do’.117 What is lacking in his argument, however, is an account of 
the social and political conditions under which a constitutional order of the kind 
he describes can flourish.  
 
In recent work, however, Dyzenhaus confronts squarely the ‘realist’ view that 
seeks ‘to understand law purely as a matter of political and social forces’.118 He 
specifically rejects accounts which hold that law is not an ‘autonomous constraint 
on actions but a constraint which those with political power will accept or not 
depending on their relative strength’.119 Dyzenhaus argues: 
 
In making these moves, realism denies the worth of legal theory altogether, 
seeing it as an attempt to hide the facts of power, in which legal considerations 
are but one of a number of, and far from the most important considerations, 
when one is seeking to understand the constraints on the state. However, in 
seeking to debunk legal theory and refocus our concerns on political and social 
forces, realism also gives up on the aspiration of the rule of law to replace the 
arbitrary rule of men with something qualitatively better. Realism is an account 
of the dynamics of power, not an account of authority. It does not simply mount 
an inquiry from a different theoretical perspective.120 
 
This passage suggests that Dyzenhaus is hostile to any account of law that seeks 
to diminish the role of law in constraining the state. But elsewhere, he qualifies 
his stand: ‘This kind of theory goes much further than a claim that legal theory 
cannot be divorced from a political [or] sociological understanding of the forces 
that shape the practice of law, a claim which I completely endorse’.121 
 
The problem with this qualification is that this does not take the stage of 
constitutional development into account. We can consistently aspire to develop a 
legal order that subordinates politics to law, while recognizing that, at a 
particular stage of constitutional development, the founding of a constitutional 
order is itself a political struggle that take place outside law. The process of 
creating a constitutional order, as the experience in Southeast Asia demonstrates, 
                                                 
117 Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law, supra note 7 at 233. 
118 Supra note 112 at 37. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid at 38. 
121 Ibid at 37. 
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requires a political struggle and a cultural transformation. Once it is established, 
political and social forces will fade into the background and jurisprudence can 
take over; yet in these forces rest the viability of the constitutional order. In this 
respect, Learned Hand’s wartime observation is illuminating:  
 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, 
upon laws, and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false 
hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can 
even do much to help it.122  
 
The real threat to a liberal constitutional order posed by an emergency, then, is 
not simply the creation of legal black holes,123 but the gradual acceptance of 
executive power unconstrained by law and with it, the erosion of the social and 
political foundations of the constitution. 
 
(c) Lessons for Constitutional Theory 
 
I turn finally to the general lessons this analysis holds for constitutional theory. 
In the years leading up to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the 
United Kingdom and in the decade since its passage, modern constitutional 
theory in the UK has witnessed a renaissance. Unconstrained by debates about 
originalism and interpretivism that have plagued US constitutional theory,124 UK 
constitutional theory has focused on the appropriate role of the courts relative to 
parliamentary practices and traditions, as the primary check on executive power. 
Those who defend the legal constitution see an important role for law and judicial 
review in subordinating politics to the rule of law.125 Those who seek to revive the 
political constitution see legal liberalism as antagonistic to the mature and 
sophisticated kind of civil republicanism they seek.126 This is, of course, 
something of a caricature; recently, both sides have tried to show how law and 
politics are complementary. But at the very least, they disagree on which 
ultimately takes precedence (a debate whose pedigree in public law extends back 
                                                 
122 Irving Dillard, ed., The Spirit of Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1959) at 144. 
123 See Johan Steyn, ‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ (2004) 53 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1. 
124 For a recent engagement with these issues, see Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, 
Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions (New York: OUP, 2007). For two recent 
examples of attempts to move away from an exclusive focus on the courts, see: Mark Tushnet, 
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); 
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: OUP, 1999) (but note Waldron’s comment, at 
16, that he intends his arguments ‘to be heard in the British debate, not to offend American 
constitutional pride or sensitivity’). 
125 See, for example, Tom R. Hickman, ‘In Defence of the Legal Constitution’ (2005), 55 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 981; Sir John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] Public Law 72.  
126 See, for instance, Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2003). See also Martin Loughlin, 
‘Rights, Democracy, and Law’ in Tom Campbell et al., eds., Sceptical Essays on Human Rights 
(Oxford: OUP, 2001), 41-60; Martin Loughlin, Swords and Scales (Oxford and Portland: Hart, 
2000). The idea of the ‘political constitution’ can be traced in recent scholarship to J.A.G. 
Griffith’s article, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 The Modern Law Review 1.  
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for centuries) and in their assessment of whether the recent ‘judicialization of 
politics’ is a positive development.127 
 
The emergency powers debate, in its preoccupation with the question of which 
institution—the courts or the legislature—is better positioned to check the 
exercise of emergency powers by the state largely tracks and draws on the larger 
debate in constitutional theory. And so, with a modicum of caution, the same 
criticisms of the former debate may be extended generally to the latter. Take, for 
example, Adam Tomkins’s defence of the political constitution in his treatise 
Public Law,128 which has attracted much scholarly attention. Tomkins argues 
that in contrast with the American understanding of the separation of powers as a 
separation of powers among three branches of government (legislature, 
executive, and judiciary), the English constitution is premised on a separation of 
powers between the Crown and Parliament.129 As such, he argues, the political 
constitution – ‘in which those who exercise political power (let us say the 
government) are held to constitutional account through political means, and 
through political institutions (for example, Parliament)’130 – plays a greater role 
and, he argues, should not so quickly be displaced by a more court-centred 
conception of public law. Tomkins argues, with reference to parliament-based 
mechanisms of executive accountability (such as collective and individual 
ministerial responsibility) that these mechanisms make ‘an outstanding 
contribution to the task of holding the Crown’s government to account’ and that 
the political constitution is therefore ‘alive and well.’131 We should not, he 
concludes, assume that ‘no constitutional problem is solved unless it is judicially 
solved, and that there is no constitutional problem that cannot be solved by the 
judiciary.’132 
 
Tomkins’s book is an important contribution to a growing body of scholarship in 
constitutional theory that is attempting to draw our attention away from a single-
minded focus on the courts as the sole concern of constitutional theorists. His 
account of the political mechanisms of accountability is important in as much as 
it shows us (in similar fashion to the emergency powers theories of Ackerman, 
Ferejohn and Pasquino, and Scheuerman) how institutions other than the courts 
can play an important role in constraining executive power and emphasizes 
(echoing Gross) the importance of a democratic ethic of political responsibility.  
These are important issues in constitutional theory, no doubt; but Tomkins’s 
argument is ultimately one of optimizing mechanisms of accountability; and a 
survey of constitutional orders (even limited to liberal democracies) will show 
that there is a range of different institutional arrangements for checking 
executive power. Tomkins recognizes that the United Kingdom is engaged in a 
process of renegotiating the ‘relationship between political and legal institutions 
                                                 
127 See Loughlin, Swords and Scales, ibid, at 4-5.  
128 Supra note 126. 
129 Ibid at 39-54. 
130 Ibid at 18. 
131 Ibid at 169. 
132 Ibid at 210. 
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and methods of accountability’.133 But here it is appropriate to recall Dyzenhaus’s 
point ‘that the question of how the institutions of a particular legal order attempt 
to bring to realization the ideal of the rule of law is less important than that they 
do.’134 
 
A detailed study of mechanisms of accountability in any particular jurisdiction is 
an important part of constitutional analysis in that jurisdiction, particularly when 
reforms are on the table. But in undertaking such a study, it is important not to 
lose sight of the fundamental problem of arbitrary state power, including the 
arbitrary exercise of coercive state power, which is a real threat in developing 
constitutional orders—and which resurfaces in constitutional theory in liberal 
democracies in times of crisis. A study of the challenges faced by developing 
constitutional orders reminds us of what it takes to establish a culture of 
accountability or justification135 within the institutions of the state, and what it 
takes to ground that institutional culture in the social and political realities of a 
particular society. And it might also remind those of us living in liberal 
democracies in the midst of an apparent emergency how much there is to lose by 




IV. CONCLUSION: REFUTATIONS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS 
 
I started this paper with the deliberately provocative claim that constitutional 
theory in Western liberal democracies is increasingly parochial. I argued that the 
experience of developing constitutional orders holds important lessons for 
constitutional theory, including the lesson that theorists in liberal-democracies 
should not take for granted the basic constitutional mechanisms for legal and 
political accountability, however much they might disagree about the optimal 
arrangement of those mechanisms. This argument invites two broad sorts of 
objections from different perspectives. The first objection is that my argument 
allows too much latitude on the part of developing constitutional orders to abuse 
human rights in the name of an emergency (the ‘free pass’ objection136). The 
second objection is that my argument, in drawing a distinction between a 
developed, liberal-democratic West and the developing constitutional orders of 
Southeast Asia, presumes and privileges a ‘Western’ understanding of 
constitutionalism and the state above other ways of structuring political authority 
                                                 
133 Ibid at 210-11. 
134 Supra note 117. 
135 According to Dyzenhaus (following Etienne Mureinik), such a culture of justification comes 
about when ‘a political order accepts that all official acts, all exercises of state power, are legal 
only on condition that they are justified by law, where law is understood in an expansive sense, 
that is, as including fundamental commitments such as those entailed by the principle of legality 
and respect for human rights’: see ‘Deference, Security, and Human Rights’ in Benjamin Goold 
and Liora Lazarus, eds., Security and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 125-56 at 
137. 
136 I am grateful to Arun K. Thiruvengadam for articulating this objection to my argument. 
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(what we might call the ‘Orientalist’137 objection). Let me conclude by explaining 
briefly why I don’t think these objections are successful. 
 
The free pass objection is directed at my claim that the there is an important 
normative distinction, in the emergency powers context, between states that are 
seeking to establish a constitutional order and those that are seeking to preserve 
one. Although I do not in this paper develop the implications of this distinction 
for developing constitutional orders,138 it is an important objection that follows 
from my argument, so I want to sketch my response. It is important to 
acknowledge that my argument is premised on the assumption that there is some 
measure of commitment on the part of the governments in question to 
constitutionalism or the rule of law, even though the full implications of this 
commitment (including its implications for substantive legality) may be 
controversial. The argument seeks to show how the invocation of emergency 
powers, while sometimes necessary, has the potential to undermine this 
commitment, and shows what is necessary to follow through on it. Holding on to 
emergency powers for longer than necessary can undermine a government’s 
commitment to constitutionalism and its ability to establish and nurture the 
social and political foundations of a constitutional order.  
 
What of the ‘Orientalist’ objection that my argument presumes and privileges a 
‘Western’ notion of constitutionalism? There are two reasons why this argument 
is unconvincing. First, although the examples I use as drawn from Southeast 
Asia, there is nothing particularly ‘Asian’ about the development of a 
constitutional order. Southeast Asia provides fertile ground for thinking about 
emergency powers because of the diversity of legal and political structures and 
the relative frequency with which emergency powers have been invoked in recent 
times. But the same arguments I have made concerning, for example, the dangers 
of political instability in a nascent constitutional order and the need for a firm 
social and political basis for that order, were as relevant to the project of restoring 
confidence in public institutions in Northern Ireland after the ‘Troubles’139 as 
they are to the rebuilding of public institutions in contemporary East Timor. So 
there is nothing particularly ‘Asian’ about my arguments; its implications are 
much broader. 
 
My second response is that we need not assume that legal liberalism necessarily 
provides the only or the best way of constraining state power in an emergency or 
otherwise. There may be other non-legal ways of constraining state power that 
are consistent with the underlying social and political culture which are more 
                                                 
137 See Edward W. Said, Orientialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). I am grateful to M. 
Sornarajah for alerting me to this potential misreading of my argument, though he did not frame 
the concern in ‘orientalist’ terms. 
138 I develop this argument in other work: see ‘The Emergency Powers Paradox’ supra note 51. 
139 Restoring confidence in public institutions was one of the key aims of the Agreement Reached 
in the Multi-Party Negotiations, 10 April 1998, Cm 3883, known as the ‘Belfast Agreement’. See 
Colin J. Harvey, ‘The New Beginning: Reconstructing Constitutional Law and Democracy in 
Northern Ireland’ in Harvey, ed., Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern 
Ireland (Oxford: Hart, 1999), 9-51. 
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effective and more appropriate. Thailand provides us with a fascinating example 
of a dysfunctional constitutional order that is experimenting with alternative 
means of constraining state power. Drawing on political anthropology and 
political sociology, we might speculate on other ways of structuring and limiting 
political authority beyond the confines of the modern state. But to the extent that 
societies are organized around Weberian states that command a ‘monopoly on 
the legitimate use of physical force’,140 the challenge of limiting state power in an 
emergency remains a legal one, however grounded it must be in the social and 
political reality.  
 
The invocation of emergency powers invites constitutional theorists to confront 
fundamental issues about the structure and foundation of the constitutional 
order. We might tackle these issues by asking the usual questions about how to 
interpret the constitution, who should do this, and which mechanisms of 
institutional accountability are most effective. Or we might venture beyond the 
familiar and ask why anyone would want a constitutional order in the first place. 




140 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation  in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (New York: OUP, 1946), at 78. 
